[Yol. XX But lawyers and judges often face de novo situations where no positivist legislation, scripture, or legal text necessarily provides insight, guidance or precedent for judicial decision. As such, a judge having to decide a case must utilize a degree of discretion in determining the rule of law for a given case. Premodern Muslim jurists of Positivist and Mu'tazilite backgrounds both recognized that jurists must use discretion.
But the challenge tney faced was in how to justifY that resort to discretion.
NA ruRAL LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR DISCRETION
For both groups of jurists, one option was to rely on competing models· of naturalism. Mu'tazilite jurists like al-Jassas discussed below certainly argued that reason could provide a sufficient basis for asserting the divine law. But al-Jassas justified his position by situating the use of reason within a natural teleology that tied reason to the divine will through the medium of nature. The power of this position was that a naturalist jurist like al-Jassas could make a claim about the divine law by recourse to extra-scriptural indices, where scripture was otherwise silent.
Positivist jurists responded to Mu'tazilite naturalism in their own way. Certainly they denied that reason can independently arrive at the law of God. But as I will discuss below, a Positivist jurist such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. I 11 I) still recognized that at times a jurist must utilize his discretion to arrive at a law of God. Positivist jurists admitted that the Shari'a can address all situations' This is not to suggest that there is a determinate scriptural answer for every given legal issue, but rather that for Positivists the Shari'a in its totality provides guidance about the spirit of the law that a jurist can rely upon to decide a novel case. To tap into this spirit of the law through the totality oflhe Shari'a, ajurist like al-Ghazali adopted a softer naturalism whereby he rooted the normative quality of nature in the dictates of scripture. For jurists like al-Ghazali, nature is both an objective basis for rational analysis, and a nonnative foundation for obligation.
Certainly its nonnativity is scripturally detennined; but once normativized, nature becomes the foundation for even Positivist jurists to argue teleologically to the law of God through juristic discretion. 
NATURAL RIGHTS AND LIMITED DETERMINACY IN DISCRETION
But more than theorizing about foundations for discretion, premodern Muslim jurists actually seemed to utilize discretion in a way that satisfied their concern to provide limited determinacy and objectivity to their decisions of the law of Shari'a. Specifically, premodern jurists seem to have utilized discretion-based context sensitive conceptions of the individual and social good to which they gave legal expression in order to create and justify a particular rights distribution scheme with limited determinacy and predictability.
These jurists often posited two sets of rights, the rights of God and the rights of individuals (huquq Allah and huquq al-' ibad or al-nas).
The rights of God referred to the public interest and welfare, and involved a distribution of rights and duties across society that arguably manifested a conunitment to a vision of the social good, however that may be defined. The rights of individuals involved personal, individual rights that jurists believed attached to the individual by virtue of his presumed nature. Often the two sets of rights would overlap or conflict.
As discussed below, jurists had to balance the competing values and interests at stake to determine a rule of law in any given instance.
But before they could balance the interests, they first had to give those interests some substance. By reviewing pleading requirements concerning the crime of false accusation of illicit sexual relations, I
argue that underlying the juristic determination of pleading rules and distribution of rights were conceptions of the individual and social good that the jurists both contended with and balanced to effectuate the greatest good through the law. This is not to suggest that the jurists were always explicit about what those conceptions were. Rather, what this article shows is that jurists were doing more than simply reading scripture as if its meaning were transparent. It seems that whether they were theorizing about juristic discretion or creating a rights regime under the Shari'a, jurists created, negotiated and ultimately justified a particular rights distribution scheme on the basis of competing foundational conceptions that provided limited determinacy in the light of an active use of juristic discretion.
NATURAL LAW IN ISLAMIC LAW
The Positivist opposition to natural law and the authority of one to rationally order divine obligations arose amidst a theologically oriented conflict between premodern jurists, some of whom did allow one rationally to ascertain divine obligations where scripture was otherwise silent. The story of the natural law tradition in Islamic law is a tale of theological rivalry as well as jurisprudential nuance. It pitted the Mu'tazilite jurist-theologians against Positivist theologian-jurists, many of whom were Ash'arite theologians. These were two premodern theological schools whose disagreements spilled into their jurisprudential debates on legal theory, methodology, and ultimately on what I will call natural law. The Mu'tazilites are often considered the rationalists in Islam, and advocated a naturalist thesis to ground their use of reason with objectivity and normative authority. The Ash'arites, while not oblivious to rational argument, nevertheless opposed Mu'tazilite naturalism on the grounds that the latter indulged human reason to the detriment of obedience to the divine will. The Ash'antes' position was positivist in the sense that they required one to look to express scriptural text for authority and clarity on divine obligations. This underlying tension between the theological schools is clearly evident in the way their adherents argued about natural law. By natural law, I am focusing on one specific issue of the many that comprise natural law debates.' Specifically, I want to address the role of reason and nature in detennining divine obligation where scripture provides no guidance. Can human reason be a mechanism by which individuals can detennine the divine law? If the answer is yes, then what is the foundation for using reason in this fashion? In other words, in the face of scriptural sources like the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet, how does reason fit into the ontological and epistemic picture of determining divine obligations?
Mu'taziJite naturalist authors such as the prominent Hanafi jurist Abu Bakr al-Jassas' (d. 370/981)' argued that reason can be a source of divine obligation. The challenge was to provide a foundation for reason that justified one's resort to it. AI-Jassas utilized a natural teleology, based on an objective and nonnative sense of nature, as the foundation for both universal and circumstantially defined values. AI-Jassas argued that all of creation is created for humanity's benefit. He based this 5. For a discussion of various issues discussed within the field of natural law theory, see Pauline C. Weslennan, fhe Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finn;! 12 (Brill 1998).
6. For his work of jurisprudence, see Abu Bakr Ahmad h. 'Ali al-Jassas, Usul al-Ja5Sos: of Fusulfi al·Usul. cd. Muhamm ad Muhammad Tamir (Dar al-Kutub al-'lImiyya 2000 ) .
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In staling the death dale of authors, I rely on both the Islamic and Gregorian dating system. The Islamic calendar started in 622 CE when Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina. The reference to the Islamic date is used to illustrate the extent orlhe elapsed time from the era of the Prophet. assertion on a Qur'anic verse which reads: " [God] it is Who created for you all that is in the earth" (alladhi khalaqa larum ma ji al-ard jami'an)' The idea is that God put nature at the disposal of humanity.
Consequently, it can be used in any way that benefits people' Human fulfi llment is the telos and purpose of God's creation. But this teleology should not be confused with an ethically bleak utilitarianism.
Naturalists like al-Jassas were not interested in the calculus of the greatest good. Rather, they used nature to ground their teleology in what they believed to be an objective creation, which also embodied the normativity of the divine will.
They expressed this naturalism by discussing the meaning of concepts such as the good (husn, hasan) and evil (qubh, qabih) , and the ruling on an act prior to the existence of revelation (min qabla wurod al-shar ').
Some scholars such as Crone have argued that ethical questions about pre-revelation society were really about a hypothetical state prior to the existence of any revelation, a type of state of nature scenario.IO Others such as Kevin Reinhart have argued that this hypothetical was an indirect way for jurists to contend with a situation that was too difficult to deal with directly. In other words, they posed a counterfactuaI, and debated the issue in the abstract."
However, I suggest that this hypothetical was not a hypothetical at all. Jurists were not trying to avoid a difficult question, or speaking about some fictional state where no revelation exists. They were in fact theorizing the foundation for the use of juristic discretion to address those situations where no scripture addresses a given issue,l2 Premodern jurists would argue that in such cases, an act unaddressed by scripture can be either presumptively pennissible, presumptively prohibited, or in a state of suspension. Mu'tazHite naturalists like al�Jassas argued that all acts in creation are presumptively permissible (ibaha)," He infused nature with a divine,
8. Qur'an 2:29.
9. Al-Jassas, supra n. 6, at 2: 100; AI�Qadi Abu ai-Hasan' Abd al-Jabbar al-Asad'abadi, al [Vol. XX purposeful nonnativity, and hence ascribed the legal value of pennissibility to all acts not addressed by scripture. As such, nature becomes both the "is" and the "ought" as al-Jassas fused fact and value to move from the objective reality of nature to a nonnative assessment reflecting the divine will.
For al-Jassas, acts not addressed by scripture are subject to rational evaluation." Some acts may embody universal values of obligation and prohibition, whereas others may be contextually defined: as such, their presumptive valuation is one of pennissibility, although that may change depending on the circumstances. Concerning universal values, al-Jassas said that where there is no scripture, some acts may be universally obligatory (wojib) and not subject to change. Wajib, as detennined by reason, applies to those acts that are universally understood as obligatory, such as having faith in God (iman), thanking one's benefactor (shukr al-mun 'im), and pursuing fairness (insoj) 1 5 These acts are always obligatory and never change in value. Likewise, matters may be deemed to be universally prohibited. These acts are those that one assesses as universally and unchangeably evil, such as disbelief and oppression. Specifically, al-Jassas stated: "[Among the acts known before revelation 1 is that which is bad in itself (qabih Ii nafsihl) and prohibited, and which does not change and alter from its state (halihl). , , 1 6
Concerning acts whose values depend on a more context-sensitive inquiry, al-Jassas held that one may rationally detennine these acts to be pennissible, prohibited, or obligatory pursuant to the benefits and harms arising from the acts in question ('ala hasab ma yata 'al/aqu bi fi'lihi min manafi' al-mukallafin wa madarrihim),17
Whether onc views the state or essential character of an act (najS, hal), or the benefit and hanns that an act poses, at stake in this inquiry is an investigation into an empirical and objective reality. This reality serves as the foundation for al-Jassas' epistemic model. But to move from what is to what ought to be, al-Jassas must invest this reality with normative value.
The terms "benefit" and "harm" (manafi " naj, madarr, da rr) certainly reflect empirical observations. But I suggest that they also reflect a nonnative reality, given the naturalist 14. AI.Jassas, supra n. 6, at 2:99-105. 15. Id.at2: IOO. 16. Id. 17. Id. presumption that creation was made for the telos of human fulfillment.
Arguably, al-Jassas used these terms as a technical shorthand to reflect the divine intent to satisfy human needs, to infuse nature with normativity, and thereby to assert a natural teleology. [n other words, the idea that nature poses a benefit for humanity-a benefit purposefully created by God-reflects not only an empirical reality but also a normative one, given the divine imprint on creation.
For al-Jassas, whatever is not addressed by scripture and is not among the universal values is automatically considered permissible if the act poses a greater benefit than harm (lam yakun fihi darrun aktharu min rna yujtalabu bi fi 'lihi min al-nafl ." Pennissibility here is a positive rational assertion of normative value. It is the base value of all acts prior to any further investigation into scripture or circumstance. The presumption of permissibility is the means by which al-Jassas argued for the normative value of an objective nature. This argument was based on al-Jassas' presumption that creation is divinely intended to satisfY the telos of human fulfillment. He held that creation could have been created for four possible reasons. First, God may have created nature to benefit no one in particular. But this is a waste and foolhardy ( 'abath wa safa h ).19 Perhaps God created nature to cause injury and not to benefit anyone (khalaqaha Ii yadurra biha min ghayr naf ' ) . l0
According to al-Jassas, such a proposition would be presumptively abominable and detestable (ashna ' wa aqbah).'1 Third, God may want nature and all of creation to benefit God. But that is impossible, he wrote, since God is not affected by benefits (manafi I or harms (madarr). 22 The only possibility left for al-Jassas is that God created nature to benefi t humanity (annahu khalaqaha Ii manafi' al mUkallafin).2 J Because creation exists for the advantage of humanity, all acts (which are a part of creation) are presumptively beneficial for mankind (makhluqatun Ii manafi' al-mukallafin). 24 The term "manafi'" and the general notion of benefit denote both an objective good and a purposeful divine creation for human enjoyment. Benefit, therefore, is not only some purely empirical quality, but also is intended to capture the normativity of the divine will. The idea that God would create creation [VoL XX for human benefit speaks to how al-Jassas united both fact and value, thereby making nature an empirical and normative foundation for his theory of discretion and the determination of obligations. In other words, al-Jassas argued against those who held that nature is not dispositive and that one cannot presume nature to be beneficiaL For al Jassas, his view of nature involved a metaphysical assumption about creation, expressed in the notion of benefit (manafi', intifa), that ultimately was intended to create room for the use of juristic discretion to move fr om the objective empiricism of reality to a normative assessment of value without engaging in any logical fallacy.
Shihab aI-Din al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285), a late and significant
Malikite-Ash'arite Positivist jurist, criticized the legacy of Mu'tazilite naturalist scholarship, like that of al-Jassas, which considered reason to be a basis for establishing obligation. But in doing so, he also censured his Ash'arite brethren for unfairly characterizing the naturalist position.
As will be seen below, many Positivist authors assumed that the 
POSITIVIST CRITIQUE OF NATURAL LAW TELEOLOGIES
The principal Positivist criticism against the naturalist position of the Mu'taziJites was that Mu'tazHites converted an empirical observation into a normative one. Or in other words, they turned an "is"
into an "ought", thus combining fact and value. This criticism suggests that one cannot move from an inquiry into empirical nature and assume that it necessarily implies or carries any normative value. Positivists denied that nature is either detenninative or normative. Nature, in other words, does not always pose masalih. assess such divinely established matters by a rational analysis into harms and benefi ts since God is beyond such mundane affairs. This does not mean that humans cannot make determinations of good and bad. But they can only do so in those areas not already addressed by God. Furthennore, their detenninations are not tantamount to God's will since God has not made a decision in these areas. Al-Juwayni stated:
it is not prohibited [for humans] to investigate these two characteristics [Le., the good and the bad] where harm may arise or where benefit is possible, on condition that [the detennination] not be attributed to God, or obligate God to punish or reward (lam yamtani' ijra ' hadhayn al-was/uyn fina idha tanajjaza darrarun aw amkana naf'un hi sharI an la yu 'za i/a Allah wa la yujibu 'alayhi an yu 'aqibu aw yuthibu). 4 0
By granting humans the ability to make moral determinations but not the ability to assert divine obligations, Positivists allowed for assessments of good (husn) and bad (qubh), but not obligation (taklif).
Obligation could only exist by reference to scripture. Without scripture to rely upon, no one can assert a rule of divine obligation. Positivists would often hold that the ruling in such a case is in a state of suspension
(tawaqquf). 41
The rule may exist in the "mind" of God, but The presumption is fr eedom from liability (bara 'at al-dhimma) and the path to obligation is through scripture (shar ). According to al-Baji, the path to obligation is through scripture, and because of that he knew that Muslims are not obligated to pray a sixth prayer, pay an additional alms tax (zakat) or fast in a month outside of Ramadan. 45
For Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, although the rules of scripture cannot be known independently by reason, one can rationally determine that one is otherwise free from divine reprimand where there is no scripture.
The absence of rules can be rationally known epistemically, and tawaqquf He also mentioned that the Positivists (ashab al-hadith) adopted this position as well. 44. Abu Walid aI-Baji, supra n. 42, at 2:700.
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consequently that state of absence continues unless proven othelWise by express scriptural legislation." Therefore, while the presumption of continuity is a rational presumption, it is not tantamount to the Basran Mu'tazilites' presumption of pennissibility.
The presumption 
POSITIV1ST SOFT NATURALISM
Despite the fa ct that Positivist jurists like those noted above denied a role for reason in establishing obligations, some nonetheless recognized that one would have to rely on juristic discretion to determine rules of Shari'a. The presumption of continuity was simply a rule of non-liability; but it was not a tool for asserting positive obligations in situations where scripture was silent. The fundamental challenge Positivists jurists fa ced when addressing the use of juristic discretion to detennine new rules of Shari 'a concerned how to justify the resort to such discretion. Ultimately jurists such as the Ash'arite Shafi'ite al-Ghazali, for example, adopted a softer naturalism than al-46. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, al 1:585.
47. On the role of iSlisnab ai-hal for those who adopted the tawaqqufposirion of suspension, see al-Qassar. supra n. 41, at 157; ai-Khatib ai-Baghdadi. supra n. 41. at 191-192; Abu Ishaq al Shirazi, supra n. 32. at 2:986; al-Lamishi, Kitabfi Us ul al-Fiqh 188 ('Abd ai-Majid Turki ed., Dar ai·Gharb al-Islami 1995). The Andalusian Zahiri jurist Ibn Hazro presented a different way to deal with this situation. He questioned those who argued that in cases where there is no scripture, one must avoid such matters out of precaution (ihtiyat). But Ibn Hazm argued thai this approach cannot be used as a basis for prohibition since it docs not produce certain knowledge, but rather only probable knowledge (zann). Ruling by ihtiya t is to rule by zann, and ruling by zann is to rule by deceit (kadhb). For Ibn Hazm, the rule pursuant to ihtiyat seems to be based on a notion of piety rather than legality. Rather, si nce God has specifically stated that all of creation is for human benefit, the presumption of ihliyal counters the very terms of scripture. Consequently, although they relied on a naturalist thesis to justify juristic discretion, Positivists designed their naturalism in a way that preserved God's omnipotence. To illustrate this soft naturalism, I will fo cus on the work of al-Ghazali.
AI-Ghazali's soft naturalism relied on both divine grace (jad£) and accepted authorities (scriptural and consensual) as a justificatory fo undation for any incorporation of nature as a basis fo r extending and creating law. He erected a model of discretion that relied on intuition, a theology of God's grace, and inductive reasoning from scripture, by which he crafted basic aims and goals of the legal system. He argued that these aims of the legal system or the maqasid were those that any legal system or community would uphold; and he illustrated the existence of those aims in Shari'a by reference to various scriptural rules in the law. These basic aims provided the telos of the law-a telos based on an intuitive sense of the good. This soft naturalism is still a form of naturalism because al-Ghazali would determine whether a particular good (mas/aha) satisfied one of the basic aims of the legal system and could be a normative basis for generating a rule of law.
This resort to mas/aha is tantamount, I argue, to incorporating a naturalistic account into the legal interpretive process.
Mas/aha is defined as the salah or something that poses a good." Through adopting the mas/aha as a basis for legislation, al-Ghazali fused the empiricism of nature and the good with a scripturally justified normativity that could serve as the fo undation for discretion-based obligation. He based the normative value of masalih (sing. mas/aha) on the fo undation of scripture and demanded a rational nexus between the mas/aha and the basic aims of the law.
But once mas/aha was detennined to be a fo undation for generating law, the mas/aha became the fo cal point for al-Ghazali's soft naturalism. By fusing fa ct and value by reference to both nature and scripture, al-Ghazali avoided the hard naturalist models adopted by Mu'tazilites such as al-Jassas that fused fa ct and value in a way that some argued required God to act purposefully for the good, thereby undermining God's omnipotence.
Rather, for the soft naturalists, the good or mas/aha in nature was a product of divine grace.
We can take it into account because of scriptural indicators that render it a nonnative source for inquiry. But because its goodness is the product of divine grace, God can change His mind and alter nature in a way that does not provide the good in any dependable fa shion. Consequently, by combining intuition, scriptural fo undations, and a theory of divine grace, al-Ghazali crafted a model of soft naturalism that relied on nature as a justificatory foundation for discretion, but preserved God's omnipotence and voluntarism by building his soft naturalism on the pillars of scripture and divine grace. This essay will fo cus on two of al-Ghazali's works on the topic of mas/aha, namely Shifa' al-Ghalil and his monumental study on usul al fiqh called ai-Mus/asfa min 'Ilm al-Usul. Shifa ' al-Ghalil seems to have preceded ai-Mus/asia , and ai-Mus/asia represents al-Ghazali's matured ideas on the topic of legal theory. " In the discussion on maslaha and its related technical terms, the discussions in both works paraliel each other, with some diffe rences. This study will fo cus primarily on al-Mus/asfa , while indicating where al-Ghazali modified his earlier views by reference to relevant passages from Shifa ' al-Ghalil.
For al-Ghazali, to discuss any procedure for generating rules by reference to benefits or mas/aha, one must first know what a mas/aha is. Generally, the term maslaha can refer to anything that allows one to obtain a benefit (jalb manfa 'a) or to repel a harm (dal ' madarra)." But al-Ghazali's use of the term had a more technical meaning than this general linguistic understanding. Certainly, the aim of all creatures (maqasid al-khalq) is to obtain benefit and repel harm. This. however. does not mean that maslaha has this meaning for the purposes of a legal methodology. As a legal term of art, maslaha refers to any interest that upholds and preserves the purposes articulated within the divine law (al muhajiza a/a maqsud a/-shar '). It is impossible that any society (milia min a/-mi/af) or any legal system (shari'a min al-shara 'i J. which aims to benefit creation (is/ah a/-kha/q) would not include prohibitions against neglect of and restraint from these five va lues.
5 9
According to al-Ghazali, it was not surprising that no legal system differed over certain prohibitions, such as the prohibition of disbelief (kulr), murder (qatl), fornication and adultery (zina), theft (sariqa), and consuming intoxicating substances (sharb a/-muskir). '" Any mas/aha at issue must in some way appeal to these basic five values. In other words, the mas/aha must pose a nexus to the basic values before it can be utilized as a ground or foundation for a legal rule.
But not every mas/aha that poses a nexus to the basic purposes is a valid basis for a rule of law. AI-Ghazali judged the masalih (sing. mas/aha) by reference to different relationships that they have to both the basic aims above and to the body of scripture inductively analyzed.
Concerning the relationship of the mas/aha to scripture, al-Ghazali divided the masalih into three categories. For instance, some masalih are positively afflmned by scripture. [Vol. XX and centrality of scripture in al-Ghazali's legal methodology, and is arguably offered to circumscribe the extent to which mas/aha values are incorporated into the law.
The last category of mas/aha to be considered in the light of its nexus to scripture is the one on which scripture is completely silent.
There is no express adoption or rej ection of this maslaha by any specific textual indicator (nass mu 'ayyan)." This type of mas/aha is the one that can be the basis for generating de novo rules of law. This third and final mas/aha is central to al-Ghazali's soft naturalism. It represents the area where a jurist utilizes greatest discretion, since the other masalih are either accepted or rejected by scripture. And it is in justifying the discretion used to deal with silent masalih that we find al-Ghazali developing his natural law theory.
To further ensure that a silent mas/aha can be a proper basis for discretionary legal interpretation, al-Ghazali required a second nexus between a silent mas/aha and the five goals or aims of the legal system. A silent mas/aha can pose a nexus to the basic aims of the Shari'a in three different ways. It can present a necessary interest (darurat) for fulfilling the basic aims of the legal system, in which case such a mas/aha is of the highest order. Alternatively, it can pose only a basic need (hajat), where the mas/aha is deemed important, but does not rise to the highest level of social interest. And lastly, a silent mas/aha can present an edificatory interest that speaks to underlying cultural norms (tazyinat, tahsinat). 66 The silent mas/aha is divided into these three subcategories that represent its significance (quwwa) or degree of nexus to the five basic values." Underlying each of these categories of interests are subsidiary interests that supplement or perfect the primary rules of these categories (talani/a, tatimma).68
Examples of necessary interests might be those that uphold the five basic values, such as punishments for consumption of alcohol, murder, and adultery. Of course, those are punishments based on scriptural texts and not silent masalih; however, they illustrate the kind of nexus al Ghazali had in mind when addressing the silent masalih that posed necessary interests. An example of a mas/aha that poses only a need might be the rule empowering a guardian (Iaslil a/-wali) over a minor in matters of marriage. This is not a necessary interest given that the marriage of minors is not significant for preserving society. It is a rule that ensures that the minor marries someone who is suitable. "But this is not like empowering the wali over upbringing (tarbiyatihi), nursing (irda 'ihi), and buying clothing and fo od." " These latter responsibilities pose necessary interests with a tight nexus to the basic aims of the law.
In fa ct, they are so central to society that no disagreement in the law on such issues can be imagined, according to al-Ghazali. 70 Marriage of a minor does not pose such a necessity. According to al-Ghazali, the longings of desire do not arise in children (fa la yarhaqu ilayhi tawaqan shahwa), nor the need to procreate. Rather, such marriages are intended to improve one's situation by linking clans (ishtibak al-'asha 'ir). " Where issuing testimony in court held a certain social meaning concerning social status, slaves were denied any participation in this activity. However, the rule denying them this capacity posed the lowest level of a rational nexus to the basic values. In contrast to this, the rule denying slaves the capacity to be a guardian over a minor appeals to a general need (haja ). In other words, denying a slave the capacity to be a guardian over children involves a public interest of greater importance than denying the slave the capacity to testify in court. Where guardianship over a minor in general posed a darura interest, denying the slave this capacity was only meant by certainty will be addressed below. And last the interest served must be for the benefit and perfection of society at large and not for a defined group of people or special interest group. AI-Ghazali used the term kulliyya to capture this final condition of scope." Consequently, while al-Ghazali seems to have adopted a type of soft naturalism premised on intuitive basic goods and mas/aha as fo undations for juristic discretion, he made considerable effort to limit the scope and extent to which this sort of naturalistic discretion was utilized in the law. An example of where al-Ghazali derived rules in the light of these three conditions involves a hypothetical where unbelievers waging war against a Muslim anny utilize innocent Muslims as human shields to protect their front line. Al-Ghazali asked whether in this situation, the Muslim army can fire upon the unbelievers knowing that in doing so, the Muslim army will kill the Muslims used as shields. The answer to this question involved a context sensitive inquiry into the nature of the interest involved. He wrote:
If we refrain from [the unbelievers] they will charge into us and conquer the land of Islam and kill the rest of the Muslims. But if we strike at the shield, we shall kill a Muslim who is innocent and who has committed no infraction. There is no knowledge of this in the law. If we refrain. the un believers will take power over all the Muslims and will kill them, and then will kill the prisoners [used as a shield]. So it is possible that one could say: "This prisoner will be killed in any case." Protecting all the Muslims poses a tighter nexus (aqrab) to the aim of the law because we know with certainty (qat) that the aim of the law is to reduce killing, just as it aims to terminate killing entirely where possible. If we arc not able to terminate [killing] we can reduce it. This involves a resort to a mas/aha whose nature as a goal of the law is known by necessity (hi darura), not by one piece of evidence or a specific scriptural source, but by evidence beyond estimation (hi odilia kharija 'an al-hasr). "
If instead the enemy was fo rtified in a castle and stiIl used Muslims as human shields, the analysis would change according to al-Ghazali. In this case, the Muslims cannot be certain that they can conquer the enemy in the castle, given its fo rtifications. Furthermore, conquering the castle does not pose a necessary interest as the non-Muslims penned up inside do not pose a risk to Muslim lands." [Vol. XX This is not to suggest that al-Ghazali relied on a stark utilitarian calculus concerning the good of the many. His approach to mas/aha is not about maximizing the good while a minority bears the burden of the expense. Rather, his approach seems to involve a conception of the good that speak to the aims of society and its attainment of the telos of its own perfection. For instance, al-Ghazali posed a second example about a boat that is sinking. Suppose the passengers come to the conclusion that if they throw one person over board, chosen by lottery, the boat will not sink and the rest of the passengers can be saved. They may be certain about this fa ct, and certainly it poses a necessity in the light of preserving life. But for al-Ghazali, the condition of scope is missing. The interest served is not kulli because those affected by the sinking boat are limited in number. The injury the passengers would suffer is not tantamount to· the massive destruction that could be imposed on MusHm society at large if the enemy were to make advances in battle and conquer Muslim land.8J The scope of interest is not the same in the two hypotheticals noted above.
The condition that a mas/aha pose a universal value for all of society suggests that what is at stake is more than just a utilitarian principle of maximizing happiness.
Rather, what seems to be at play is a preconception of what benefits society at large and will contribute to its advancement and perfection.
The law is not intended to be a tool fo r specific groups. It embodies an aim and goal fo r society at large.
Another example AI-Ghazali used involves beating someone suspected of having stolen property. Certainly to beat him and obtain a confession poses a positive public interest. AI-Ghazali even noted that rights is represented by al-Ghazali' s use of the term ahwan, which is an evaluative term about the relative weight of the two mas/aha interests involved here, How he strikes this balance is left unexplained. Perhaps like his basic goods, he relies on intuition. Suppose someone causes corruption in the land to achieve social discord IjiI1la). Is it lawful to kill this person? Certainly there is a public interest in doing so. But does it rise to the level of a mas/aha on which we can base legal conduct? AI-Ghazali answered that the resolution to this question depends on the circumstances.
If the individual has not engaged in any criminal activity requiring his execution, the authorities should imprison him only_ Life imprisonment (takhlid a/-habs 'a/ayhi) is sufficient to meet the evil that this person wreaks on society.86 There is no need to kill him, according to al Ghazali, who said that "this mas/aha is not darura." "
In other words, al-Ghazali balanced the need to protect human life and limit government uses of violence with the need to ensure public order by using his mas/aha schematic to analyze the necessary rule of law that can govern this situation in a way that poses the best and most suitable nexus to the overall goals of the legal system. But suppose that this agitator lives in an era of extreme social discord and the existing government may be toppled any day, and cannot guarantee that it can keep the agitator imprisoned for life.
And further suppose that imprisoning the agitator for life will only increase his anger and hatred. In this case, is it permissible to kill the agitator? For al-Ghazali, these circumstances raise important questions, but at the same time are purely speCUlative. There is no way to detennine what will happen in advance, and one cannot thereby operate on what is tantamount to mere conjecture and speculation (hukm bi a/-wahm). "
This last hypothetical takes al-Ghazali back to his first hypothetical concerning the enemy who uses Muslims as human shields. Suppose the Muslim anny is not certain that the non-Muslims will exterminate Islam from the land if the shields are left intact, but only knows that this is likely to happen (bi gha/abat a/-zann). " Is this sufficient for allowing the Muslim army to fire on the Muslim shields? For al-Ghazali, firing on the human shields is permitted if one can reach certainty that it is necessary, or if not absolute certainty, then at least a degree of likelihood and mere speculation is a middle ground where something less than certainty may suffice to support a rule of conduct in a case where no specific scriptural precedent exists but which poses a gravely significant matter that has society-wide ramifications.
Of course, this hypothetical runs into one major scriptural contlict, namely those verses of the Qur'an that prohibit killing a believer intentionally or killing one without a right against him." Is it possible to justify killing Muslim human shields on the basis of a maslaha where that mas/aha seems to contradict scriptural prohibitions quite starkJy?
AI-Ghazali was keen to suggest that he is not advocating a type of utilitarian inquiry into what benefits the many over the fe w. This, he suggested, was evident in his hypothetical about the sinking boat.
Rather, he argued that in this case one must first investigate the totality of the law. "We know that the law prefers the universal scope (al-kulli) , over the particular or narrow scope (al-juz 'i). ,, 93 Protecting the people of Islamic lands from their enemies is "more important for the aims of the law (ahamm fi maqsud al-shar , ) than protecting the life of a single Muslim."" And importantly, for al-Ghazali's intuitively based soft naturalism, this knowledge of the law's purpose is so certain and clear that it does not need any specific scriptural evidence to say so.
Specifically he stated that this purpose's "certainty is not in need of any evidence" (wa al-maqtu 1 bihi La yahtaju i/a shahadat asl).95 Notably, al-Ghazali emphasized that the mas/aha analysis was not a purely rational inquiry into the law. Rather he suggested that it was fundamentally based on scripture. He said that mas/aha is not a fifth source of law, alongside the Qur'an, Sunna of the Prophet, consensus (ijma ') or rule by precedent (qiyas)." Rather legislating by resort to mas/aha involves upholding the purposes of the law as articulated in the Qur'an, Sunna and ij ma' in some fa shion (haft. maqasid a/-shar')." Whether one looks to the totality of these sources (tasarruJa t a/-shar ') to inductively justify a mas/aha or to corroborate basic values and goods, a mas/aha analysis implicitly relies on these sources and consequently cannot be an independent source of law.98
This 1S not to say that ruling by mas/aha is tantam ount to rule by precedent or qiyas. Rather, qiyas relies on a specific indicator (asl mu 'ayyan). Ruling by mas/aha is intended to fulfill and satisfY a basic aim of the law that is known not by a single piece of evidence hut by an inestimable amount of evidence from the Qur'an, Sunna, the context of situations, and various separate indices (bi adilla kathira /a hasr /aha min al-Idtab wa al-sunna wa qara'in aI-ahwal wa tafariq al-imarat).99
Consequently, the basic purposes of the law are not solely captured by some inductive analysis of scriptural text. Rather, the full totality of circumstances, both textual and contextual, plays into the determination of the basic goods of society and the law. These goods are known intuitively, and as such, a mas/aha that poses the necessary nexus to those goods can be the basis for a rule of law.
Important to this discussion is how al-Ghazali justified his reson to mas/aha while distinguishing it from Mu'tazilite naturalism.
Mu'tazilites like al-Jassas argued on the grounds of a rationally based natural teleology that they could fuse fa ct and value, thereby rendeting nature nonnative by default. It was as if they could say that God is bound to uphold the good and the beneficial by the very essence of nature. AI-Ghazali was keen to distinguish his resort to naturalism from the harder naturalism of the Mu'tazilites. Consequently, we find al Ghazali stating in no uncertain terms that his resort to mas/aha as a basis for rules of law is not to be understood as an adoption of the Mu'tazilite argument that God is obligated to do the good. But this does not mean that he refused to fuse fa ct and value. Rather the issue is how he fused [Vol. XX them. He fused fact and value in the light of both a jurisprudence that is premised on the basic aims of the law that he considers intuitively known, and a divine voluntarism that preserves God's omnipotence while nonnativizing the facts of nature. For instance when writing about the darurat maslaha values, he said that they are the goal of the divine legislator (maqsud a/-shari ') and constitute necessities for creation (darurat al-khalq). Importantly, he stated:
Reason indicates them and decides upon them whether or not there is law (/au la wurud al-shara 'j '). [They] are those for which no law can be without according to those who speak of the good and the bad as rational matters (tahsin al-'aql wa taqbihihi). We say:
It is for God most high to do as He wishes with his servants; it is not obligatory on Him to uphold the good (ri 'ayat ai-salah). [But] we do not deny the power of rational capacities to indicate the beneficial and the corrupt (al-masalih wa al-mafasid), and their ability to warn against hann and to desire obtaining bounties and fulfillment. Nor do we deny that the prophets, on them be peace, were sent for the benefit of creation in matters of this world and religion (Ii masalih al-khalq ji ai-din wa al-dunya}-as a mercy and grace fr om God on creation (ra hma, fa dl), and not [because oj] an imposition or obligation on Him. God most high said: "We did not send you except as a mercy for the world," and so on from verses that illustrate as much.
Indeed we have explained [ourselves] to this extent in order that we not be associated with the beliefs of the Mu'tazila (i 'tiqad al-i ·tizaf) .'oo AI-Ghazali argued that one can rationally investigate the empirical good and bad. But the normativity of that assessment is based on a theory of divine creation that preserves God's omnipotence. The fact that al-Ghazali can fuse fa ct and value in his use of maslaha is based solely, according to him, on the fa ct that God out of His grace and mercy provides benefit to human beings through His act of creation. The normativity of nature is established in the light of a voluntarism that maintains the willfulness of God, denies any obligations on God, yet upholds a teleology linked to a normative nature whose normativity is the product of a willful divine grace. Maslaha thereby fuses both the empiricism of nature and normative value without indulging in a natural teleology that has the theological implications of imposing on God obligations to do the good. Under al-Ghazali's version of nature, God is not bound to do the good. But He does so out of His choice and will. We as humans can rely on the constancy that is elemental to God's grace, and fuse fa ct and value to create legal norms through a rational assessment of empirical reality. But we are also aware that God can alter His grace if He chooses.
NATURAL RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCRETION
Jurists did more than theorize in the abstract about the use of juristic discretion and the need for determinacy amidst interpretive freedom. Positivists and MU'tazilites could not escape a reliance on juristic discretion to determine the law. But to discuss discretion at the theoretical level does not necessarily indicate that jurists used discretion in creating specific rules of law. However, as shown below, jurists utilized discretion in creating specific rights regimes in ways that also evinced their concern with providing at least a limited determinacy in the fa ce of individual interpretation. They provided limited determinacy by relying on certain fo undational principles by which they could distribute rights and entitlements across society. These principles provided a base level of determinacy and obj ectivity to the use of juristic discretion.
These fo undational principles, though, are not always explicit or express in the textual sources. Rather they are gleaned from the rationales jurists provided for the rules they created. In some instances, the fo undation of a right depended on some inherent conception of the individual and his nature. In other cases, the fo undation of a right or liability depended on an overarching conception of the kinds of commitments we make to society as participants in a common endeavor.
And still again, the fo undation of a right may be based on a conception of the good that balances the needs of individuals with the commitments we make to society. Fundamentally, the premodern juristic concern with fo undations seems to have involved an underlying theoretical concern with the use of discretion and the need to provide predictable results and at least a limited determinacy in the law. As will be shown below, jurists seem to have relied on cenain conceptions of the individual and the social good that they gave expression through the law to determine both rights and duties in a way that utilized discretion but avoided radical indetenninacy.
The term used in Arabic for right is haqq. Premodern Arabic lexicographers provided a complex defmition of this term. On one hand it can refer to the certainty or truth (yaqin) of a matter, and is an antonym fo r fa lsehood (bali!).'01 When it is used with the definite article [Vol. XX (al), al-haqq is a name for God (The Truth).
I02 It can also refer to property, justice, and that which wisdom or prudence brings about (Ii mujid ai-shay ' bi hasab rna taqtadihi al_hikma).I03 But what is most compelling in the defmition of the term haqq is the fa ct that lexicographers related that the Arabs often would say haqq invokes "that which I must do" (haqq 'alayya an a[ 'ala dhalik).I04 In other words, when one says "there is a haqq on you to do X" (haqqa 'alayka an ta['ala), he means that "you are obligated" to do X (wajaba 'alayka). 1 05 Certainly, haqq refers to a duty. But underlying this definition is an ambiguity as to whose interest is served by satisfaction of that duty.
One may be obligated to do something, but for whom? The interest served may be a private one but in other cases -it may be a public one.
When the interest is private. the tenn "right" seems a suitable definition for the term haqq. By using the term "right" to capture the meaning of haqq in haqq al-'ibad or the right of individuals what is intended is to embrace the complex of interests that individuals hold when participating as members of society. Whether these are interests in freedom from interference (liberty interests), or interests that assert an entitlement (claim interests), the term haqq seems to capture them both by simultaneously asserting an obligation on one person and creating a claim in another. 1
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But in the case of the huquq Allah or public interests, the term "right" in the phrase "right of God" seems inappropriate. The huquq Allah do not fundamentally invoke specific litigable individual interests.
Rather, as shown below, the government has the duty to uphold such public interests on behalf of society. The government's imperium places upon it the responsibility to effectuate the public interest through its legal and punitive instrumentalities. The huquq Allah seem to reflect an understanding of a vision of some common good or public welfare interest. Consequently, the use of "right" to translate the phrase huquq Allah into "rights of God" seems inapt and misleading at first. However, because jurists generally associated the rights of God with the public interest as vested in the government itself, I utilize the phrase "rights of God" as a technical term of art to represent a public policy interest that must be effectuated by the government, given its presumed exclusive authority and power over the mechanisms of violence and compulsion.
The ambiguity as to whose and what interest is served by the haqq may help us understand the discretionary dynamics that premodern jurists engaged in when devising rules of law, and distributing rights across society amidst competing interests. The rights of God were deemed to address the public interest, whereas the rights of individuals spoke to personal interests. Using this heuristic, jurists arguably distributed rights by balancing the competing substantive interests posed by the needs of the community and the needs of the individual through the discretionary creation of rules of law. They both gave substance to these conceptions and ba1anced them to reach a result that was not arbitrary and subject to undisciplined speculation.
CASE STUDY: PETITIONING IN A CASE OF SLANDER
A case where the rights of God and rights of individuals heuristic balanced competing interests is in premodern discussions on the crime of slander of fornication/adultery, or qadhf In Islamic criminal law, certain punishments are elaborated in the Qur'an, and as such they are considered explicitly articulated and defined by God. These are called the hudud crimes (sing. hadJ). Slander is one such crime. Specifically the Qur'an states: And [concerning] those who level a charge against chaste women and do not bring fo ur witnesses, whip them eighty lashes and do not accept their testimony ever, fo r they are corrupt, except for those who repent thereafter and act righteously. Indeed God is fo rgiving and merciful.
[Vol. XX over defi ning the purpose of the penalty and the good it seeks to effectuate. And by arguably relying on contextual conceptions of the individual and the social good, the jurists seemed to be searching for a fo undation to justify their rights distribution schemes to provide a degree of determinacy to their discretionary rulings.
Much of the debate arose out of a concern over what good is achieved from the punishment for qadhf On one hand, it deters people from engaging in slander, which is a public good; on the other hand it affects retribution for an attack on a specific person's dignity and honor, thus vindicating a personal interest. The more a jurist fo cused on the deterrent effect of the punishment and its effolt to rid the world of evil, the more he likely saw the sentence of slander as upholding a right of God. One of the underlying purposes of the rights of God, such as those underlying the hudud penalties, is to achieve a sense of social welfare and benefit through deterrence (zajr or inzijar) .'o , The deterrence function of the punishment of slander was seen as supporting the public good and hence was considered a right of God. For instance, the Hanafi jurist Badr ai-Din al-' Ayni (d. 855/145 1) held that if viewed as a public right, or as he called it a haqq al-shar', the punishment fo r slander is to rid the world of corruption (ikhla ' al-'alam 'an al-fasad). In this sense, the punishment invokes a right of God since it does not peltain to any one person, but is in the interests of the general society ,109 It maximizes social good by deterring people from an evil that may adversely affect the common welfare of society.
A right of individuals, on the other hand, satisfies someone's persona] interests. In the case of slander, one interest at stake is the victim's dignity and honor (a 'rad).'1 0 The more one understands the penalty of slander to vindicate a person's honor and dignity, the more one is likely to view the right at stake as being a personal, individual right-a haqq al-'abd. In fa ct, the Shafi'ite jurist and judge al-Mawardi (d. 450/1 058) believed that honor is something integral to each person, like his physical well-being and property. He wrote: "What is invoked in the case of [injuries to our] physical well being and property are personal rights, and so too in the case of [injuries to our] dignity" (kana ma wajaba fi al-dima' wa a/-amwal min hllquq a/-adamiyin. fa kadha/ik rna wajaba fi a/-a 'rael), III Whether the punishment of slander is a right of God or a private right, therefore, depends on how one understands the purpose underlying the sanction. What good does it seek to vindicate and for whose interests, the public's or the victim's?
The impact of this debate about whether the punishment of slander is a right of God or a right of individuals affects various issues in the area of pleading and litigation. The rights of the plaintiff to initiate his case, to have it prosecuted, and to ultimately waive the infraction all depend on whether one views the punishment of slander to invoke a right of God or a right of individuals. The more it embraces a right of God, the less discretion the individual claimant will have in prosecuting his case, and the more the government will play a dominant role in redressing the wrong in the interests of the public good. If, on the other hand, it is a private right, the plaintiff will have greater flexibility in whether and how he presses his claim against the defendant. Jurists writing in all the four Sunni schools of law raised these pleading and litigation questions, and in doing so, they ultimately balanced the competing interests at stake. For instance, must the plaintiff petition the authorities for redress? In other words, suppose defendant D slanders plaintiff P and P never brings a petition for redress. But W I and W2 witnessed the slander. Can the state prosecute D on the testimony of WI and W2 without a petition from P? Suppose the right is a right of God and P must petition. If P fails to petition, does that mean P can III. AI-Mawardi,supra n. 108, at 11:10.
effectively negate a right of God? If rights of God are supposed to benefi t society, does any requirement to petition unduly empower P with an authority to undermine social well-being if he chooses not to petition? Alternatively, if the right is a private right, can the state prosecute D without P's presence or petition? What if P is embarrassed by the situation and wants the case to disappear to protect his already attacked honor? If the right is an individual right, then P should have the right to decide if the case proceeds or not.
To illustrate the balancing at stake when distributing rights, I will fo cus on the issue of petitioning in a slander case. Among the Sunni schools of law, the Shafi'ite school tended to view the punishment of slander as predominantly a haqq al-'abd or a right of individuals.
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This is in large part reflected by the fa ct that they required the plaintiff to petition fo r the punishment before the political authority would carry it out. In other words, they did not permit a case to be prosecuted only where there are witnesses who observed the slander and later testified before a court. The government cannot apply this sentence without the injured party first raising the issue, and voicing his or her desire for redress. For jurists such as al-Mawardi (d. 45011058), the petition requirement underscored the fa ct that the interest at issue is predominantly a personal right, and not a right of God. If it were a right of God, he suggested, no petition would be required.
III
For other Shafi'ite jurists such as Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi (d. 676/1277 ) the right at stake is mostly a private right, but he admitted that there is some reason for calling it a right of God. For instance, the punishment for slander is eighty lashes fo r a free person. But if the perpetrator is a slave, the penalty is halved. For al-Nawawi, from the perspective of the victim, whether the perpetrator is free or a slave should not matter. What matters is that the victim's right has been violated. The reason the punishment is halved, therefore, must reflect an interest of God's, thereby suggesting that the punishment of slander is not simply an individual right but includes some components of a right of God. Nevertheless, al-Nawawi argued that despite the fusion of both rights in the same penalty, the right at stake is mostly a personal right since the victim must first file a petition in order to seek redress and can waive the violation if he so chooses.! \4 conceptions about rights and entitlements across society.
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[Vol. XX The Malikite position best reflects the underlying tension in defining the punishment of slander as a right of God or a private right. Generally, the Malikites argued that the penalty of slander presents a mixed right, where both the right of God and the right of individuals are implicated. For instance, the Malikite jurist Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 54311 148) recognized that there were two views on whether the right is a right of God or a private right. The debate, he suggested, arose among the schools of law because the underlying crime violates both sets of rights. But for him, the crime invokes largely a private right because, in part, the right is contingent on the victim filing a petition. The political authority can carry out the penalty only if a petition (mutaliba) has been filed.l20 But because the Malikites attempted to take a middle position, they also imposed limitations on the plaintiff in order to effectuate the interests underlying the right of God component of the crime. Specifically, after the crime has occurred but before it is petitioned to the government, the right that is implicated is an individual right. Consequently, the victim has the right to petition for redress or waive his rights. Once he petitions for redress, though, the victim can no longer waive his rights. After the petition has reached the governing authority, the right transfonns from being a private right to a right of God, and as such, the political authority must carry out the prosecution and punishment.
J21
Nevertheless, the Malikites still tried to preserve the individual's rights even after the matter reaches the political authority. In some limited cases, where the victim does not want the pUblicity of the case, and instead prefers the matter be removed from public view (sitr), he can still waive his rights even after the courts have begun hearing the matter.'22 This exceptional ruling applies to the situation where the claim is brought by those other than the victim. For instance, suppose two witnesses observed the slander and filed a claim with the political authority. '" In this case, the Malikites did not require a petition by the victim and instead allowed others to bring the case; but they did permit the victim to dissolve the case after it has reached the courtS.124
This approach balances the public and private aspects of this crime. The public evil is so broad as to grant others standing to bring a claim without the victim present. But it is not so broad as to deny the victim the right to shield himself from further embarrassment by a public proceeding.
Among the Hanafites, the dominant view was that the punishment of slander represented a right of God 127. AI-Qaffal, supra n. 1 12; al-Mawardi, supra n. 108, at 11:9.
128. Ibn Rushd (al-Jadd), supra n. 124. personal violation of rights. Furthennore, later Hanafites, such as Ibn Nujaym (d. 97011563) , required the victim to be present when the actual punishment is inflicted.'" To view the right as a right of God yet require both a petition to be filed and the victim to be present seems contradictory at first blush. In fact, the Andalusian jurist Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1063) noted that the Hanafite position, which considers the right a right of God but requires a petition, is inconsistent '" The Hanafite jurist, al-Kasani (do 58711 191), recognizing this potential incongruity, held that the requirement of a petition does not vitiate the fact that a right of God is at stake. Rather, the petition requirement satisfies proceduraJ requirements concerning the mechanism of liti�ation. But it does not affect the substantive quality of the right at stake.' , Abu Hanifa's disciple Abu Yusuf (d. 1821797) is reported to have held a different view from his teacher. Abu Yusuf considered the punishment of slander a mixed right (haqq mushtarak). Consequently, he required a petition to be filed by the victim, and even allowed the victim to waive his rights, but only before the case reached the political authority.'" The later Hanafi al- Marghinani (d. 59311 197) also believed that the right is a mixed right. For him, the issue centered on whether one emphasizes the individual right more or less than God's right. He held that the dominant right is that of God, and consequently, while he required a petition, he did not allow the right to be heritable for instance. I))
To summarize, the debate above presents a technical inquiry into the petition requirement for a case of slander. The Shafi'ites and Hanbalites required the victim to petition before the penalty of slander would be applied. This requirement, according to many of them is what made the right at stake a right of individuals. The case is contingent on the individual asserting a right that arguably expresses a shared commitment concerning his entitlements. If there is no petition, there is no case and no punishment is meted out against the defendant. This is a classic position of those who adhered to the view that the punishment of slander poses a violation of a dominantly individual interest. The crime at its heart is an infraction against the individual, where attacks on dignity and honor are best seen as an individual affair.
On the other hand, the Malikites anempted to balance the individual and public interests in a case of slander through, in part, the petition requirement. First, they allowed the possibility of a case being brought by someone other than the victim. Second, they asserted that prior to filing the petition, the right at stake is a private right. But once a petition is filed and government machinery is invoked, the public takes an interest in the outcome. The case is no longer about the victim's personal rights, but rather reflects the public's interest in upholding the values of honor and dignity, which are not simply individual affairs. Yet, in those cases where the petition is brought by those other than the victim, the victim has the option to defeat the prosecution. Hence while the dignity interests at stake reflect larger public concerns, the Malikites did not lose sight of the fact that this crime involves a personal stake in one's dignity.
The public interest in honor and dignity is perhaps best represented by many Hanafites who considered the punishment of slander a right of God. For them, the virtues at stake were those that pertained to society at large. While the attack is clearly on one's individual dignity and honor, the right to enforce and uphold such values does not reside in the individual but rather belongs to the public through the governing authority. While the Hanafites nonetheless required the victim to file a petition to have the case heard, they considered the petition to be virtually a neutral procedural requirement for upholding the right of God.
The debates illustrate that the jurists were doing more than specifying technical issues of litigation procedure. Arguably, they were utilizing their discretion over the law to create rules of pleading which manifested contested meanings of dignity, which they implicitly utilized to give 1imited determinacy to their use of discretion. The fact that the Qur'an specifically identifies this infraction and specifies an exact punishment renders this crime significant in ways that other possible crimes are not. Perhaps these jurists believed that God singled out this crime, and in doing so, intended to articulate a social value that transcends the individual and his entitlements, and speaks to a larger value to which society at large must aspire. The challenge for the jurists was how to balance the interests of the individual with the social interests that seem to be invoked by the Qur'an in a way that was not random, but which nonetheless required juristic discretion given the lack [Vol. XX of scriptural guidance on the matter. When jurists used the heuristic of the rights of God and the rights of individuals, they were attempting this substantive and discretionary balance. The different outcomes among the schools did not reflect simply basic disagreements in reading scriptural text. In fa ct, when discussing the petition requirement, jurists did not actually invoke scripture at all. Rather, it seems that underlying debates such as those on petitioning was a contest concerning the competing conceptions that jurists of a particular school held on the individual, his society, and the relationship between the two.
C ONCLUSION
The prevailing historiography on [slamic law perpetuates a scriptural positivism characteristic of an inherited Islamic orthodoxy, while at times illustrating · how premodern jurists struggled to infuse some flexibility into a system that was otherwise beset by the posilivist presumptions of textual authority.
'34 The ability to look to indices besides scripture was hotly contested among premodern Muslims, as it is among today 's Muslims along the modernist and fundamentalist spectrum.
By fo cusing on the natural law and natural rights traditions in such decisions could have the force of a divine obligation.
Nevertheless, as illustrated by al-Ghazali's discussion on mas/aha, even Positivist jurists relied on a naturalistic argument to provide a fmmdation for their use of discretion where scripture is otherwise silent. But Positivist naturalism was softer than Mu'tazilite naturalism in that it was not based on a rationally derived natural teleology that provided a persistent fo undation for inquiry. Rather, Positivists like al-Gbazali tried to balance the need for a naturalistic justification for discretion with the desire to maintain a theology of God's voluntarism and omnipotence. Consequently, their naturalism, as illustrated by the discussion on al-Ghazali, was based on a textual fo undation and the notion of God's grace. Scripture provided the normative basis for rendering nature value-laden, while God's grace preserved God's everlasting omnipotence. For Positivists like aJ-Ghazali, nature was certainly beneficial. But that benefit was due to God's grace, which could change were God to change His mind. Whereas al-Jassas' naturalism embraced a sense of nature that yielded persistent benefits in a way that effectively seemed to impose an obligation on God to do the good, al-Ghazali's naturalism preserved God's voluntarism, while utilizing nahJre as a fo undation for objectifying and nonnativizing the products of juristic discretion.
Discretion therefore has a theoretical fo undation in the usul al-fiqh literature. But more than just a topic of abstract theoretical analysis, discretion played a role in the actual determination of legal rules where scripture seemed to be silent. By relying on the heuristic device of the rights of God and rights of individuals, premodern jurists arguably incorporated extra-scriptural inquiries concerning the nature of the individual and conception of the social good into their juristic inquiry to inform the law and infuse it with limited determinacy. To illustrate how this conceptualization of juristic discretion along naturalistic lines seems particularly relevant to contemporary debates on Islamic law, a final example will suffice. Recently, news reports from Ontario, Canada suggest that the province may implement Shari 'a arbitration panels for Muslims to seek resolution in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance pursuant to Islamic law. In her report, Marion Boyd argues that such a panel would rely on "Islamic principles" to determine and decide cases. 135 What these principles are, however, is left entirely ambiguous. Are these principles reflective of historical [Vol. XX precedent or the consensus of premodern jurists (ijma ' ) on aspects of marriage and divorce law? Are they principles such as the al-qawa'id al-fiqhiyya, which are interpretive presumptions that guide legal analysis where scriptural texts are less than clear, or that resolve conflicts between competing evidence? In the end, this phrase is unclear and largely meaningless.
To understand the dilemma this phrase presents, and the general challenges that the arbitration panel will face, if it is implemented, an example from premodern divorce law will suffice. Under the premodern Islamic law of divorce, a husband had the unilateral, unresrricted right to divorce his wife without recourse to court adjudication (Le., talaq), while a woman had to petition a court to obtain a divorce. A wife could seek either a fo r-cause divorce or a no-cause divorce. In a fo r-cause divorce, she alleged some fa ult on the part of her husband (e.g. fa ilure to support, abuse, impotence) and sought a divorce while preserving her financial claims against her husband. In a no-cause or khul' divorce, a woman asserted no fa ult by her husband, and agreed to fo rgo any financial claim against her husband to regain her freedom from the marriage.l36 The difference between a husband's right of divorce and a wife's right was fundamentally a matter of the degree and scope of the power to assert one's liberty interests. A premodern talaq divorce allowed the husband to avoid any court involvement. He simply pronounced to his wife that she was divorced. He was subjected to limited maintenance for a specified period of time thereafter. The wife's power of divorce was a more limited power that restricted a wife's freedom to divorce by subj ecting her to court oversight and, in the no fault option, imposed upon her a duty to forfeit her financia1 claims against her husband. Arguably, the husband's power was a greater power, whereas the wife's power to seek divorce was much more restricted.
According to the premodern Shafi'ite jurist al-Mawardi (d.
45011058), the husband's unilateral power to divorce was based, in part, on a Qur'anic verse which reads: "0 Prophet, when you divorce women, . Notably, a woman may reserve for herself in her marriage contract the power to unilaterally divorce her husband. But this must be negot iated with her husband, and is not the default position. divorce them at their prescribed periods.
, ,137 One might ask why should men be given the unilateral right to divorce their spouses to the exclusion of women? Why not read this verse as a procedural mechanism rather than a grant of substantive right? In other words, one could argue that both men and women have the right of unilateral divorce, but that it must be used in a manner that accords with certain procedural protections outlined in this verse. But this was not the reading given to this verse. For instance, according to al-Mawardi, although this verse is directed to the Prophet specifically, it actually has a general import and is applicable to all Muslims .'" The question for al
Mawardi was whether the substantive right of divorce implied by this verse extends only to men or to women as well. He said that the ta/aq right vests only in husbands and is solely applied against wives (al-talaq La yasihhu ilia min zawj wa fa yaqa 'a ilia 'ala zawja).139 Husbands are the sole recipients of this right, despite the fa ct that both husband and wife participate and join in the contract of marriage together ('aqd al nikah).140 According to al-Mawardi, this distinction is based on the fact that the Qur'an provides that men have a degree of superiority over women (wa Ii al-rijal 'alayhinna daraja).141 Despite the Qur'anic verse, al-Mawardi nonetheless recognized the disparity in the distribution of the talaq right of unilateral divorce. But he explained that disparity as fo llows. First, since the duty to provide support and maintenance (mu 'una) fa lls exclusively on the husband, the husband is entitled to certain special rights given this difference Uaza an yukhtassu al-zawj hi iqa ' al-jirqa). '4 2 Second, and perhaps most troubling, he stated that the power of talaq is not extended to a woman because her whims and desires overtake her (shahwatuha taghlibuha) and hence she may be hasty to pronounce a divorce when there is disagreement between the spouses. But men, he said, dominate their desires more than women, and so are less likely to hastily invoke the talaq power at the first sign of [Vol. XX discord.143 AI-Mawardi's discussion is one example of a premodern juristic analysis that was utilized to distribute the right of talaq to men and not women. AI-Mawardi relied in part on his eKtra-teKtual understanding of not just the individual, but more specifically the character and other relative obligations of men and women, to detennine how a specific private right should be distributed.
As we have seen above, the conception of the individual and his or her relationship to society was very much contested by jurists through the rights of God/rights of individuals heuristic, where they arguably relied on such conceptions to balance between public and private rights, and provide limited detenninacy to their discretion over the law. But more than balancing between public and private rights, juri sts like al-Mawardi seemed to be balancing interests within the realm of private rights alone. The case of talaq is an eKample of this apparent discretionary balancing. Here, preconceptions of the nature of men and women fuel a specific reading of relevant scriptural texts, and thereby justify a particular distribution of private rights between competing parties. Jurists like al-Mawardi were not just relying on scriptural text to assert a particular division of rights.
They relied on extraneous circumstantial factors to inform how they read scripture and how they used their discretion to create a rights regime,l44
If prior Islamic legal precedent is to have any force in the Shari 'a arbitration panels in Ontario, the above rules of premodern divorce law may pose an interesting challenge to the arbitrators. Despite their unilateral power, men will have a financial incentive to seek the aid of the panel since a court-issued decree of divorce will prevent their wives from claiming that the marriage is still valid, and thereby stop them from demanding ongoing financial support. In other words, an arbitral decree enforced by Canadian courts will provide a means of both registering divorces, and granting legal clarity on the financial responsibilities of one party to the other '4S But just as importantly, how will the court treat 143. Id.
144. Notably, Muslim goverrunents such as Egypt have arguably adopted a si milar conception of both men and women to justifY thei r unequal distribution of divorce rights, despite the fact that their respective rights schemes contravene the express provisions of CEDA W, which many of them have ratified with reservations. For Egypt's reservation to Article 16 of CEDA W, which relies on a presumed Islamic di stinction between men and women see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminalion against Women (available at http://untreaty.un.arg /ENGLlSHlbihlelenglishinternetbibleipartllchapterlV/treatyIO.asp (accessed Nov. 4, 2005) ).
145. Many Muslim countries that apply Islamic marriage and divorce law have restricted a husband's unilateral right to divorce by requiring him to petition a coun for divorce. Others such as Egypt require the husband to provide his wife a notarized document i n dicating that she is divorced. See Ahmad Na'i m, supra n. \36, at 87-186.
women's petitions for divorce? Will the panel distinguish between fau lt-based claims and no-fault based claims? Will women seeking a no-cause divorce before these panels be fo rced to give up fm ancial claims against their husbands, and in a sense, purchase their freedom? If it requires this, the panel will discriminate between women seeking fa ult-based divorces, and those seeking no-fault divorces, and in a sense, penalize the latter for doing so. Furthennore, this procedure creates an incentive for husbands to act in bad fa ith toward their wives. Suppose a husband and wife are ill-matched, but the wife can allege no fa ult-based ground for divorce. The husband has an interest not to seek divorce on his own initiative, thereby fo rcing his wife to seek a no-cause divorce and renounce any financial claims upon her husband.
How the arbitrators will resolve these very real public policy concerns will depend, in part, on whether they understand Islamic law as a fixed positivist system of law based on scripture and prior precedent, or take into account a heuristic like the rights of God/rights of individuals, which arguably empowers them justifiably and legitimately to use their discretion to continue debating over the construction of the law, and the distribution of rights under Islamic law pursuant to evolving conceptions of the individual, the social good, and the relationship between the two.
